Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a ThirdPartyBlock request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it:
- the public key of the previous block (used in the signature)
- the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions)
A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair.
Consider the following example (nominal case)
- Authority
A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}
- The well-behaving holder then generates a third-party block request based on the token and sends it to third-party authority
B
- Third-party
B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}
- The token holder now must obtain a third-party block from third party
C to be able to use the token
Now, with a malicious user:
- Authority
A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}
- The holder then attenuates the token with the following third party block
thirdparty("c"), signed with a keypair pubkeyD, privkeyD) they generate
- The holder then generates a third-party block request based on this token, but alter the
ThirdPartyBlockRequest publicKeys field and replace pubkeyD with pubkeyC
- Third-party
B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}
- Due to the altered symbol table, the actual meaning of the block is
thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyD}
- The attacker can now use the token without obtaining a third-party block from
C.
Impact
Tokens with third-party blocks containing trusted annotations generated through a third party block request
References
Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a
ThirdPartyBlockrequest can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it:A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair.
Consider the following example (nominal case)
Aemits the following token:check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}BBgenerates the following third-party blockthirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}Cto be able to use the tokenNow, with a malicious user:
Aemits the following token:check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}thirdparty("c"), signed with a keypairpubkeyD, privkeyD)they generateThirdPartyBlockRequestpublicKeysfield and replacepubkeyDwithpubkeyCBgenerates the following third-party blockthirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyD}C.Impact
Tokens with third-party blocks containing
trustedannotations generated through a third party block requestReferences