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PyJWT vulnerable to key confusion attacks
High severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
May 13, 2022
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Oct 15, 2024
In PyJWT 1.5.0 and below the invalid_strings check in HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key does not account for all PEM encoded public keys. Specifically, the PKCS1 PEM encoded format would be allowed because it is prefaced with the string -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- which is not accounted for. This enables symmetric/asymmetric key confusion attacks against users using the PKCS1 PEM encoded public keys, which would allow an attacker to craft JWTs from scratch.
In PyJWT 1.5.0 and below the
invalid_stringscheck inHMACAlgorithm.prepare_keydoes not account for all PEM encoded public keys. Specifically, the PKCS1 PEM encoded format would be allowed because it is prefaced with the string-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----which is not accounted for. This enables symmetric/asymmetric key confusion attacks against users using the PKCS1 PEM encoded public keys, which would allow an attacker to craft JWTs from scratch.References